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RECENT CASES
AERIAL LAW-AIRLINES AS COMMON CARRIERS-LIMITATION ON LIABILAIRLINE FOR NEGLIGENCE-Defendant airline sold plaintiff's decedent
a ticket marked "Class A", which stipulated that defendant's liability for its
negligence resulting in death or injury was limited to a maximum of $5ooo.
Three types of tickets were sold by defendant, ranging from the Class A maximum to a Class C maximum of $15,ooo; passengers were given no further
choices. Held, that defendant was a common carrier, and that therefore, passenger having been allowed no choice between a full and a limited liability, the
stipulation in the contract of carriage would not prevent recovery beyond the
amount designated thereon. Conklin v. Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N. Y. :244,
194 N. E. 692 (935).
A provision in a contract of carriage for absolute exemption from liability for
negligence is universally held unenforceable.- With respect to a limitation on
the amount of liability for negligence, the general view is that a carrier may not
fix a maximumY Under the New York law, however, if the passenger is offered
a choice between full and limited liability, and is given consideration in the form
of a reduced fare for choosing the latter, the court will sustain the limitation.3
As for airline carriers, if there is a profession of willingness to carry persons
indiscriminately, it has been held that they must conform to the same standards
as a common carrier on land or water.4 One federal court has already held
that an airline is a common carrier so far as regards its right to limit liability
for negligence. 5 It has of course been suggested that the problem of transportation by air should be treated as sui generis, and not necessarily subject to the
same rules as carriers on land and water. 6 But aside from the greater probability
of suits, it would appear that the same considerations which cause the courts
to frown upon attempts on the part of common carriers on land and water to
restrict liability for negligence apply in the case of the air transport.7 In any
event, in the absence of a statute permitting such limitafions it is neither likely nor
desirable that the courts should feel more disposed to give effect to stipulations
in tickets purporting to limit the liability of the airline for negligence.
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I. New York Central R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (1873) is the leading case.
2. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, 66 F. (2) 710 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 696 (933) ; Ruppel v. Allegheny Valley Ry., 31 AUt. 478, 167 Pa. 166 (1895) ;
Jakeway & Tyrrell v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 12o AUt. 820, 277 Pa. 236 (1923).

3. Zimmer v. New York Central & Hudson R. R., 137 N. Y. 460, 33 N. E. 642 (1893) ;
Kilthau v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 245 N. Y. 361, 157 N. E. 267 (1927) ; cf. Anderson v. Erie R. R., 233 N. Y. 277, 119 N. E. 557 (1918).
4. See Allison v. Standard Air Lines, 930 U. S. Av. R. 292 (S. D. Cal. 1g3o) ; Law v.
Transcontinental Air Trans. Co., 1931 U. S. Av. R. 205 (E. D. Pa. 1931); McCusker v.

Curtiss-Wright, Inc., 1932 U. S. Av. R. IOO (Ill. Cir. Ct.) (holding airlines to the duty of
high care of common carrier).

5. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, 66 F. (2) 710 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 696 (933) ; cf. Aslan v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 149 L. T. 276, 278 (K. B.
1933), 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 165.
6. See Allen, Limitations of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers (1931) 2 J. Am
LAW 325.

7. The courts have generally refused to allow common carriers to limit liability for neg-

ligence chiefly because of the carrier's superior bargaining position; and also because of the
fear that the carrier would otherwise be less inclined to take precautions for the safety of the
passenger.
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BANKRUPTCY-CLAIMS AGAINST AND DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATES-PROVABILITY OF CLAIM FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF LFAS MADE BE-

FORE BANKRUPTCY--Bankrupt had contracted to lease as tenant, for a period

of twenty-five years, a building not yet built, reserving to the landlord the right
of re-entry in case of failure to pay rent, but not covenanting in that event to
pay the difference between rent reserved and the rental value of the residue of
the term. Before the time fixed for commencement of the term, receivers were
appointed, who disaffirmed the lease. At the subsequent petition in bankruptcy,
landlord presented a claim for future rent. The lower court allowed the claim
on the basis of the difference between the rent reserved and the reasonable rental
value of the premises. Held (one judge dissenting), that the claim should not
have been allowed, since the courts have consistently held that those sections of
the Bankruptcy Act allowing proof of contingent claims were not meant to include proof of claims for future rent. Urban Properties,Inc. v. Irving Trust
Co., 74 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
In general, the bankruptcy of an obligor on an executory contract creates an
anticipatory breach which will be provable in bankruptcy. Although contingent,
such claims may be proved if "fixed in amount or susceptible of liquidation." 2
Nevertheless, the leading case on provability of future rents in bankruptcy, In re
Roth & Appel, 3 held such a claim not provable on the ground that the amount
would be too uncertain, and that the obligation to pay rent does not arise unless
there has been actual occupation of the property. When Maynard v. Elliott 4
decided that contingent claims might be proved, the ratio decidendi of In re Roth
& Appel was discredited, and the decision might have fallen.3 But the United
States Supreme Court in Manhattan Properties,Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.6 chose
to follow the course of prior decisions that the bankruptcy acts were to be interpreted not to include claims for future rent-although equally contingent claims
of other sorts had been held provable, and although the Bankruptcy Act of 1933
contained a clause providing for provability of future rents.7 In the instant
case, the breach of the lease was before bankruptcy. The dissenting judge argued
that the instant case should therefore be distinguished on the basis that the claim
was due and payable in advance of bankruptcy, and hence that the claim was
not so uncertain or contingent as not to be provable. Two prior cases involving
such a factual situation in different circuits of the Court of Appeals have so held.8
i. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581 (i96).
2. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), ii U. S. C. A. § I03a (4) (1927) ; see Maynard v. Elliott, 283
U. S. 273, 275 (1931) (endorser's liability on unmatured note).
3. 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, i9io). The facts differ from those of the instant case in
that the bankrupt lessee had entered under the lease before bankruptcy. The court held that
section 63a (4) ("founded upon an open account, or upon a contract express or implied")
must be interpreted in conjunction with section 63a (i) ("a fixed liability, as evidenced by a
judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not"), and hence limited by it.
4. 283 U. S. 273 (1931). The Court decided that section 63a (4) should not be limited
by section 63a (I).
5. See instant case at 655.
6. 291 U. S. 320 (1934).

7. 47 STAT. 1468 (I933), 11 U. S. C. A. §201 (a) (Supp. 1934).

The Court reasoned
that since sections 73-76 inclusive had been inserted for the purpose of permitting extensions
and compositions not theretofore possible, and applied only to individuals, this section,
being within those sections, was not intended to be an amendment to section 63a; otherwise,
it reasoned, it would have been placed in another position. It will be interesting to observe
how the Court will treat a similar case arising under the amendment to section 63a added in
1934 [§ 63a (7), 48 STAT. 924 (934), II U. S. C. A. § io3a (7)], which specifically provides
for proving future rents.
8. In re Mulling Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; Lloyd Investment Co.
v. Schmidt, 66 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
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But the court refused to distinguish between the two situations. In view of
the reasoning in Manhattan Properties,Inc. v. Irzing Trust Co. it would appear
that the question of uncertainty is no longer controlling in the case of9 future
rents, and hence that the distinction attempted to be drawn is irrelevant.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-DoMICIL-STATE AS A PARTY TO LITIGATION OF ISSUE

OF DOmICIL WHEN DECEDENT HAD Two REsmNcEs-James A. Trowbridge

died in Connecticut. His will was probated in New York. Upon a petition by
his executors alleging that there was a question whether decedent was domiciled
in New York or Connecticut, an order was granted allowing the State of Connecticut to intervene in the proceeding before the Surrogate's Court of New
York to determine the estate tax, the New York State Tax Commission assenting. Connecticut availed itself of the license so tendered. It appeared that
decedent had been born and reared in Connecticut. He then removed to New
York, became associated with a banking firm, and acquired a residence property
there. Upon his retirement from active business, he built an elaborate home in
Connecticut and boarded up the New York home. He retained desk space,
however, in an office in New York and "described himself in all writings and
instruments as a resident of the State of New York", having been advised to do
so by counsel whom he consulted with regard to tax problems. In accordance with
this plan he voted and paid taxes in New York and filed a verified statement with
the Connecticut tax authorities as a non-resident.' Held, that decedent was
domiciled in Connecticut, because an intention to make a home in fact will override an intention to acquire a legal domicil. In re Trowbridge'sEstate, 266 N. Y.
283, 194 N. E. 756 (935).
The court adopted in substance the rule announced by the Restatement of the
Law of Conflict of Laws.2 More interesting perhaps, is the presence of a state
as a party to a suit between a Tax Commission of another state, and private
parties. For where jurisdiction to tax depends on the existence of the decedent's
domicil within the taxing state-as is generally the case with intangible personal
property 3 -and where the decedent has resided in two states, each state may
claim the decedent as its domiciliary and each assess a tax. Nor does it seem
that the second state to tax has necessarily violated the constitutional command
that "full faith and credit" be given to the judgments of a sister state; ' for
that provision is said to apply only where jurisdiction was properly assumed."
However, though a man may have two residences, he may have but one legal
domicil; 6 one of the taxing states is necessarily in error. Such a legal situation
9. The majority admitted that claims equally contingent had been held provable in other
situations. See instant case at 656. The court also repudiated the distinction between rent
and a promise to pay rent. Ibid.
I. The matter of domicil was originally referred to a Referee who found the domicil to
be New York. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Surrogate Court's confirmation of the Referee's report.
2. "The intention required for the acquisition of a domicil of choice is an intention to
make a home in fact and not an intention to acquire a domicil." RESTATEMENT, CONFLiCr OF
LAWS (1934) § 19. The court did not cite the RESTATENT.
3. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (193o) ;

First

Nat. Bank of

Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).

4. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § I.
5. Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350 (19oo) ; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43 (19o7) ; Bur82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 769; Note (1932) 81
bank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162 (914) ; see (934)
U. OF PA. L. REV. 177.
6. In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N. W. 227 (1922) ; Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me.
165 (1865); Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556 (1873); see RESTATMENT, CoNmIcr OF LAWS
(1934)

§ 13;

GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927)

§ 14.
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has matured in the taxation of the estate of Dr. John T. Dorrance, where New
Jersey and Pennsylvania both assessed a tax.7 The facts which gave rise to the
instant case might well have led to a repetition of the demonstration of two
states, each with an eye to a depleted treasury, pronouncing itself entitled to the
tax. The solution here reached seems politic and commendable, the necessity
of the Supreme Court passing on the issue of domicil being thereby avoided. 8
Should the intervening state attempt to relitigate the issue of donicil in its own
state, following an adverse judgment, it seems that the rule of res judicatashould
preclude its suit at once since it was a party to the original proceedings.

CONFLICT OF LAwS-JURIsDIcTION ovER NON-RESIDENTS--VALIDITY OF
A JUDGMENT OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY SECURED AFTER SERVICE OF PROCESS
UPON A NON-RESIDENT BY MAIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THAT
FOREIGN COUNTRY-Defendant, resident of New York, was sued in Canada for

the balance unpaid upon his subscription to the stock of a Canadian corporation, service being made upon him by mail in New York. Defendant failed to
appear, and judgment was taken against him. In suit on this judgment in New
York, it was alleged that by the laws of Canada, any person becoming a shareholder in a Canadian corporation thereby agreed to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts.- Held, that such facts did not constitute a cause
of action, because the Canadian court was without jurisdiction to render a personal judgment.

Pope v. Heckscher, 194 N. E. 53 (1934).

The basis for all questions concerning jurisdiction is that any attempt of a
state to give extraterritorial operation to its laws, or to enforce an extraterritorial
jurisdiction by its tribunals, is an encroachment upon the independence of the
state in which the person or property so affected is situated, and will therefore
not be recognized in the latter state.2 The reason underlying this principlethat otherwise such judgments would be "constant instruments of fraud and
oppression" 3-- vanishes where consent of one's person to the jurisdiction of a
particular court is given in advance. 4 Where the consent is found in the terms
of a contract, a judgment recovered in that tribunal has been given effect when
sued upon elsewhere. 5 If by the charter of a corporation, all foreign shareholders are to elect a domicile in the state of the corporation where process may
be served upon them, such provision will similarly be given recognition. 6 Likewise, where the laws of a state provide that all foreign shareholders shall elect
such a domicile, and the shareholder actually complies, he is bound by the judg7. In re Dorrance, 115 N. J. Eq. 268, 17o Atl. 6oi, 172 At. 503 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff'd,
N. J. Sup. Ct, Feb. 8, 1935, appeal pending to the Court of Errors and Appeals; Dorrance's
Estate, 3o9 Pa. 151, 163 Ati. 303 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S., 617. A suit by the executors
of Dorrance's Estate is now pending before a statutory three-judge federal court in New
Jersey, contesting the New Jersey assessment on constitutional grounds.
8. The Supreme Court has shown unwillingness to adjudicate the question of domicil.
Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43 (197) ; Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917).

1. See instant case at 53. The facts do not disclose whether the stock was purchased in
New York or in Canada. Though the strongest possible case for holding liability on the judgment would be if the defendant made his purchase in Canada, it is believed that this is immaterial to the result
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 723 (1877).

3. Id. at 726.

4. Beale, The Jurisdictionof Courts Over Foreigners (1913) 26 HiARv. L. REv. 193, 283,
297.

5. Feyerick v. Hubbard, 86 L. T. R.

ii and

829

12.

6. Copin v. Adamson, 9 Ex. 345 (1874).

(K. B. 19o2).

But cf. cases cited infra, notes
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ment of that tribunal, even in another forum. 7 But where he fails to elect such
domicile, the mere statutory provision is without effect in foreign courts."
Despite the one dictum to the contrary,9 similar decisions have been reached.
Thus, validity has been refused to foreign judgments where service was made
outside the jurisdiction of the court by mail, though under authority of rules of
court made pursuant to statute allowing this procedure in actions founded on
contracts made or to be performed in that jurisdiction.' 0 Similarly, an agreement to arbitrate according to the laws of a foreign country which allowed service
to be made outside its jurisdiction would not support a judgment thus obtained
where defendant did not personally appear." The same result was reached in a
suit on an arbitration award secured under an agreement that the foreign arbitration law apply, where the defendant was not personally served in the jurisdiction of the arbitration board. 12 Obviously, the danger in the enforcement of
the
such a judgment would be the harsh penalties that might be inflicted upon
non-appearing defendant by laws of which he was entirely ignorant.13 The
result in the instant case is therefore consistent with sound principles of Conflict
of Laws.

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL IAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-VALIDITY
GRADUATED GROSS SALES TAx-A Kentucky statute' imposed on all retail

merchants a license tax graduated according to the gross sales of each merchant
over $400,000.2 Plaintiffs, retail merchants in the state, sought to enjoin the
btate officers from enforcing the statute. Held (three Justices dissenting 2), that
the operation of the statute was "unjustifiably unequal, whimsical, and arbitrary",
and that it therefore violated the I4th Amendment. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v.
Lewis, 55 Sup. Ct. 525 (1935).

In view of the Supreme Court decisions sustaining the validity of state
statutes which impose discriminatory taxes on chain stores, 4 and of the court's
repeated refusal to inquire into the legislative motives underlying state action,,
the decision in the instant case is somewhat surprising. It is generally conceded
7. Vallee v. Dumergue, 4 Ex. 290 (849).
8. Copin v. Adamson, 9 Ex. 345 (1874).
9. Traders' Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 229, 178 N. W. 735, 737 (i92o). The
court decided, however, that no such statute had been shown and refused to enforce the judgment.
io. Kerr v. Tagliavia, ioi Misc. 614, 168 N. Y. Supp. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1917). See Keasbey,
JurisdictionOver Non-residents in PersonalActions (1905) 5 Cor. L. REv. 436, 441.

ii. Skandinaviska Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss, 226 App. Div. 56, 234 N. Y. Supp. 202
(2d Dep't 1929).
12. Gilbert v. Burastine, 135 Misc. 305, 237 N. Y. Supp. 17, (1929).
13. "Suppose there had been a provision by the law of France that whenever a member

neglected to elect a domicile he should pay double calls, are we to enforce his liability in an
action on a judgment for such calls obtained against him without his knowledge in the foreign
court?" Copin v. Adamson, 9 Ex. 345, 355 (1874).
I. Ky. Laws i93o, c. 149.

2. The sales were grouped in eight brackets, of which the first included sales up to
$4oo,ooo.

Eachl $IOO,OOO in sales thereafter, until $i,ooo,ooo was reached, was placed in a

separate bracket. Sales in the low bracket were taxed 1/20 of 1%, sales in the next bracket
were taxed 5/20 of I%, and the rate was graduated for each $Iooooo of sales to a maximum
of i% tax on sales over $1,oo,ooo.

3. Justice Cardozo wrote the dissenting opinion, Justices Stone and Brandeis concurring.
4. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931) ; Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933) ; Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 55 Sup. Ct. 333

(i935).

5. McCray v. United States, I95 U. S. 27 (19o4) ; Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S.

40 (1934).
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that a state may by its taxing power burden one class of taxpayers to the ultimate
benefit of another class, whenever it deems such action essential to the advancement of the public good.6 Moreover, the states have enjoyed wide powers of
discretion in determining what is the public good for the purpose of making tax
groupings. 7 The court in the instant case did not attempt to refute the economic
argument that a small merchant should receive special aid, but did find that the
statute in question failed to adopt a proper measure of distinction. The majority of
the court was of the opinion that classification according to volumeof business done
was arbitrary in that it represented no index of the ability to pay the tax and bore
no reasonable relation to the privilege of doing business which was being taxed.
The same act of the retailer was said to be taxed at differing rates merely because
it was performed more often by one retailer than by another,8 no attention being
paid to differences in types of goods sold or to varying merchandising methods.
Nor was the majority of the court convinced that increasing gross sales were
theoretically a proper index of increasing profit, citing figures to show that the
tax burden is borne by a few whose rate of profit varies but slightly from that
of the many." The dissenting justices, on the other hand, felt that an increase
of gross sales carried with it an increase of opportunity for profit, and was therefore a rational basis for classification. They refused to distinguish this tax from
an income tax, in which the major portion of the tax funds are paid by a few; 10
and also found some merit in the simplicity of operation and the ease of collection
of a sales tax, as compared to a profits tax.:" This argument, often advanced in
favor of the sales tax (although there is some opinion to the contrary 12), should
not be sufficient to sustain a discriminatory measure. A tax measured by gross
receipts discloses a direct burden on the fund charged with the tax, for a portion
of each dollar of income can be traced directly to the tax fund.13 In the instant
case it is clear that while all dollars of retail sales are earned in the same manner
some contribute a greater portion than others to the state, an arbitrary procedure.
The act declared unconstitutional in the instant case has since been repealed,' 4
but the decision will serve as a serious restriction on further state legislation 15
at a time when sales taxes are being given wide consideration.
6. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co.,
24o U. S. 342 (1916).
7. Heath & Milligan Manufacturing Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338 (i97) ; Brown-Forman
Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563 (igio) ; The Best Foods, Inc. v. Welsh, 34 F. (2d) 682 (S. D.
Idaho 1929) ; Penny Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, 59 F. (2d) 789 (S. D. Miss. 1932).
8. Instant case at 528. In State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283
U. S. 527 (i93i), it was decided that for purposes of taxation, chain stores may be classified
differently from department stores. In the instant case the state of Kentucky contended that
in spite of the former ruling it was proper to group the two classes of merchants together for
tax purposes.
9. Instant case at 529. In i93o two merchants whose gross sales amounted to 8% of the
gross sales of all merchants would have paid more than So% of the tax due.
IO. Instant case at 533, 534. See Sims v. Weldon, 165 Ark. 13, 19, 263 S. W. 42, 44
(1924). "A sales tax is the antithesis of an income tax."
ii. Instant case at 536.
12. SALES TAXES: GENERAIr SE.EcrivF, AND RETArr. (1932) National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., pp. 14, 28-32.
13. Taxes using gross income as a measure have been held invalid because the dollars are
directly traceable to their source, where the source was declared to be immune from taxation.
Cf. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79 (1901) ; Galveston, H. & S. A.
R. R. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (19o8) ; United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247
U. S. 321 (1918) ; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136 (1927).
14. Ky. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess. 1934, c. 25, § i6.
I5. The Vermont Supreme Court held a Vermont statute, similar in nature to the Kentucky statute, invalid, relying on the decision in the instant case. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co. v. Harvey, 177 Atl. 423 (Vt. 1935). Similar statutes have been enacted and are being
challenged in New Mexico, Minnesota and Wisconsin.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT-VESTED RIGHTSVALIDITY OF CREATION OF RETROACTIVE RIGHT IN SHAREHOLDERS TO REIMBURSEMENT AGAINST CORPORATION FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS TO CREDITORS-A

California statute provided that shareholders were liable to creditors for payment of corporate debts in proportion to their corporate holdings, under which
statute it had been held that a shareholder thus paying a creditor had no right
of indemnification against the corporation.' This statute was repealed and another passed 2 which gave all shareholders who had theretofore paid or who would
thereafter pay any corporate debt a right of subrogation against the corporation.
Plaintiff shareholder, who had paid a debt of defendant before the passage of the
second statute, sued for indemnification thereunder. The corporation argued that
the retroactive feature of the statute resulted in an impairment of its contract
with plaintiff, and a denial of property without due process of law. Held, for
plaintiff, because no contractual provision prohibiting a right of reimbursement
existed, and so no contract with the corporation was impaired by the second
statute; and because there was no unlawful denial of property. Patek v. California Cotton Mills, 40 P. (2d) 927 (Cal. App. 1935).
The protection of the "contracts clause" of the Federal Constitution extends only to true contractual obligations. 4 However, where a statutory obligation is deemed a substantial part of the obligations of a true contract, impairment
of it has not been permitted.5 In the instant case, however, the obligation of a
shareholder who had paid a corporate debt not to seek reimbursement was clearly
not consensual but imposed by statute. Moreover, the statute was evidently designed to give added security to creditors; the presence or absence of a right to
reimbursement against the corporation was merely incidental. The immunity of
the corporation from suit by the shareholder was therefore properly held not to
be a part of the "contract" between the shareholder and the corporation, and
so not entitled to the protection of the contracts clause. Nor should the retroactive deprivation of this immunity be treated as taking "property" without due
process of law. The confusion of many cases clearly demonstrates that the
dogmas that substantive as distinguished from remedial rights," or vested as
distinguished from non-vested rights,7 may not be impaired by retroactive legislation, merely beg the question in difficult cases. They serve only to rationalize
the conclusions reached by the courts on an appraisement of the injustice worked
by the deprivation in the particular situation. 8 Thus a law that makes past acts
I. Trindade v. Atwater Canning Co., 128 Pac. 756 (Cal. App. 1912).
2. CAi. Cxv. CoDE (Deering, 193I) § 322a.
3. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § Io. "No state shall . . . pass any . .
obligation of contracts."
4. Crane v.

Hahlo,

. law impairing

the

258 U. S. 142 (1922); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765

(930).

5.McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 6o8 (U. S. 1844) ; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall.
535, 552 (1867) ; Coombs v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434 (1932). But see dissenting opinion of Cardozo, J., in the latter case, at 448; Kauper, What Is a "Contract" Under the Contracts Claiue
of the Federal Constitution? (1932)

31 MicH. L. REV. 187, 200.

6. Campbell v. Holt, '15 U. S. 62o (1885) (statute reviving contract claims already
barred by the Statute of Limitation upheld) ; cf. Elwell v. Daggs, lo8 U. S. 143 (1883)
(retroactive statute making usury contracts valid, upheld). But cf. Danzer & Co. v. Gulf &
Ship Island R. R., 268 U. S. 633 (925) (court said that period of limitations on a statutory
cause of action could not be retroactively increased).
7. Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights (1927) 5 TEx. L. REv. 231, (1928) 6
TEx. L. REv. 409.

8. See Smith, supra note 7; Note
REv. 348.

(1924)

34

YAT.9 L.

J. 3o3;

(1930)

79 U. OF PA. L.
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ground for a divorce,' or that changes one type of existing estate into another,
that
or
deceased,"'
of
the
the
death
after
tax
or that imposes an inheritance
legitimizes an illegitimate child and deprives an heir who before the law had full
title,' 2 is sustained, regardless of whether it changes "substantive" or "vested"
rights, if the court's notions of fairness and its estimation of pragmatic difficulties so dictate. In the instant case the injury to the solvent defendants in being
compelled to return to the shareholder what the latter had paid on its behalf
should not merit much concern.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PERSONAL CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS-RIGHT
ExclAJDE NEGROES FROM ITS PRIMARY ELECTIONSThe state Democratic convention of Texas adopted a resolution ' limiting membership in the party to white citizens. Plaintiff, a citizen of Texas and a believer
in Democratic tenets, applied to defendant county clerk, a state officer, for a
ballot for a Democratic primary election, but was refused because he was a negro.
Plaintiff sued defendant in tort. In Texas, nomination by the Democratic party2
is equivalent to election, the general election being a mere matter of form.
Held, that defendant's action, in obedience to the mandate of the state Democratic
OF POLITICAL PARTY TO

convention, did not constitute state action, and therefore violated neither the
Fourteenth 3 nor the Fifteenth 4 Amendments. Grovey v. Townsend, 55 Sup.
Ct. 622 (935).
The Court distinguished the privilege of membership in a party from the
right to vote in a general election. Although there was at one time some doubt
as to whether a primary came within the same constitutional protection as does a
general election, 5 the Court in 1927 " purported to commit itself to the broad
policy of protecting both equally. In this respect, therefore, the instant case
represents a backward step.7 The Court reasoned, however, that a political
party is a voluntary association entitled to limit its own membership at will; and
9.Elliott v. Elliott, 38 Md. 357 (1873) ; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill

140

(N. Y. 1843).

Contra: Clark v. Clark, io N. H. 380 (1839).
(law changing existing estates tail
io. Carroll v. Olmstead's Lessee, 16 Ohio 251 (847)
into fees simple upheld); Bambangh v. Bambaugh, ii Serg. & R. 19o (Pa. 1824) (changing
joint tenancies to tenancies in common).
Ii. Succession of Levy, 115 La. 377, 39 So. 37, aft'd, 203 U. S. 543 (1905).
12. Nichols v. Stewart, I5 Tex. 226 (1885).

I. Adopted May 24, 1932. It reads: ". . . all white citizens of the State of Texas . . .
shall be eligible to membership in the Democratic party and as such entitled to participate in
its deliberations." Instant case at 623.
2. FANNrNG, DmEcr PRr.mAis (Debaters' Handbook Series, 3d ed. 1911) 94; Note
(1925) 23 MicHr. L. REv. 279, 283. Texas Courts have taken judicial notice of this situation.
See State ex rel. Moore v. Meharg, 287 S. W. 67o, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
3. The Amendment provides, inter alia: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; . . ." (Italics
supplied.)
4. The Amendment reads: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." (Italics supplied.)
5. Chandler v. Neff, 298 Fed. 5,5 (W. D. Tex. 1924) ; Note (1925) 23 MICE. L. REv.
279; cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 250 (1921).
6. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927) held that a Texas statute providing that "in
no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election" was
unconstitutional, as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. Instant case at 626. This distinction between the privilege of membership in a party
and the right to vote in a general election was, however, not decisive of the case. The main
point upon which the decision hinged was the fact that no state action was involved.
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there is authority to support this proposition. 8 In holding that the Democratic
convention was not a state agency, the Court pointed out that, in Texas, expenses of primary elections are borne, not by the state, but by individual nomination-seekers.9 For the purpose of determining whether the state may pay primary election expenses, a political party is thus considered autonomous.1 0 But
it is submitted that, for the purpose of determining whether negroes may be
excluded from primaries, the predominant consideration is that "parties . .
have become the custodians of official power." "- That primaries in Texas, as
elsewhere, are held under statutory compulsion,1 2 and are elaborately regulated
by statute, 3 would appear to indicate that the states have taken cognizance of
this development. The Court, however, replied to the latter argument that primaries were held long before statutes required them, and that state regulation is
an exercise of the police power, and does not, of itself, constitute the party a
state instrumentality. What seems the more essential factor, was dismissed. As
it is well settled that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are restraints
upon state action only,14 the action of an independent body is admittedly not
within their purview. It has thus become possible to reconcile a long-frustrated
desire of the Southern states with what naive minds had supposed was an unambiguous Constitutional prohibition.15 Others will doubtless profit by Texas'
example.

CORPORATIONS-TRANSFER OF SHARES-RESTRICTIONS ON SHARE TRANSEVALUATION FOR TAX PuRiosES-X's executors.

FER A9 AFFECTING SHARE

petitioned to determine the tax payable on shares held by decedent in a close
corporation whose articles of association contained provisions that no shares
might be transferred until after they had been offered to other shareholders at
£209, and refused; and that the directors in their absolute discretion might refuse
to register any transferee they considered undesirable. Under a tax statute the
share value was to "be estimated to be the price which . . . such property would

fetch if sold in the open market at the time of the death of the deceased."

1

The

8. Grigsby v. Harris, 27 F. (2d) 942 (S. D. Tex. 1928) ; White v. Lubbock, 30 S. W.
(2d) 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ; Bell v. Hill, 74 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tex. 1934) ; see dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 104 (1932).
q. TEx. Comp. STAT. (1928) art. 3108. But cf. Bliley v. West, 42 F. (2d) ioi (C. C. A.
4th, 193o), where the expenses of the primary elections were borne by the public treasury.
io. Hence, expenses of party primaries may not be paid by the state. Waples v. Marrast, io8 Tex. 5,184 S. W. I8o (1916).
ii. Mr. Justice Cardozo in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 84; cf. Bliley v. West, 42 F.
(2d) ioi (C. C. A. 4th, 193o). But cf. White v. Lubbock, 30 S. W. (2d) 722 (Tex. Civ.
App. 193o) ; County Democratic Executive Committee v. Booker, 53 S. W. (2d) 123 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) ; Bell v. Hill, 74 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tex. 1934).
12. TEx. COMP. STAT. (1928) art. 3101.
13. TEx. Comap. STAT. (1928)

arts. 2939, 2955, 2956, 3104.

14. Virginia v. Rives, ioo U. S. 313 (1879) ; Ex parte Virginia, 1OO U. S. 339 (1879);
James v Bowman, 190 U. S. 127 (19o3) ; Rose, Negro Suffrage: The ConstitutonalPoint of
View (19o6) I Am. Po. Scr. REv. 17, 21.
15. Cf. Bliley v. West, 42 F. (2d) ioi (C. C. A. 4th, 193o), already distinguished from
the instant case, supra note 9. In that case, a Virginia statute excluded from party primaries
any citizen "not eligible to vote under the . . . law of his party." The Democratic party
adopted rules excluding negroes. It was held that this was a violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, as the state cannot authorize a party to do that which the state itself
cannot lawfully do. Thus, it appears that if the state takes no action, as in the instant case,
a party has the right to limit its membership, but that if the state attempts to recognize this
right of a party, the recognition is invalid-a rather anomalous result. See Howard, The
Supreme Court and State Action Challenged Under the Fourteenth A7mwndntent, 1931-1932
(1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 505, 536; Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1212, 1221.
I. FINAN CE Acr, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 30, §7 (5) (1894).
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lower court found that these shares if unrestricted as to transferability would be
worth considerably more than C209. 2 Held (one justice dissenting 3), that since
such shares, if sold, would be bought by those who possessed the rights to purchase under the articles, £209 should be the tax appraisal figure. 4 In re Paldin;
In re Crossnman, lO4 L. J. K B. (N. s.) 124 (Ct. App. 1934).
Rarely have the legal consequences of restrictions on share transfer been
adjudicated from the standpoint of their effect on the evaluation of such shares
for taxation purposes. In view of the unfortunate result reached in the instant
case it may well be expected that increasing future litigation will indicate that
a new and facile means for reducing Inheritance taxes has been born.5 Three
solutions have been suggested: (i) the "realistic" view adopted by the majority
of the instant court 6-- considering all the restrictions in the articles as obstacles
serving to reduce the price which the hypothetical t~tx purchaser would pay for
such shares; (2) the intermediate view adopted by the dissent in this case and
supported by the numerical majority of cases 7 -considering only part 8 of the
restrictions on alienability in determining the share value for taxation purposes;
and (3) an apparently repudiated view of a dissenting lower court justice
disregardingfor tax purposes all restrictions imposed on share transfer in the
2. The Crown contended that the intention manifested by the wording of the tax statute
was to disregard any domestic restrictions of the company, and that the evaluation must assume that all persons were available as purchasers of the shares. Under this argument it contended for two standards of value: (i) £355-The value of a share found by the lower court
if such share were sold to an outside purchaser, other than z trust company. (The lower
court held this to be the true taxation value.) (2) £395---The value of a share found by the
lower court if such share were sold to an outside purchaser which might be a trust company.
The Crown contended ,for this particular standard that such a company has the possibility of
a continuity of holding, so as to eliminate, for practical purposes, the necessity of a transfer
upon death, and this factor, which would or might act on the mind of an ordinary transferee,
would raise their value to a trust company bidding for them. (But the lower court ruled this
contention out because of clear evidence that the directors of the brewery would refuse to
register such purchaser as a trust company on the share books. On appeal the Crown abandoned this argument.)
3. The dissenting justice voted for affirming the lower court's evaluation of £355. Instant case at 125.
4. The argument of the two majority justices for the value of £2o9 ran to this effect:
The value of a share is to be determined by the amount of money that would be received by a
purchaser. The purchaser could get only what the vendor had to sell-which was shares
whose transfer was restricted to such an extent that the existing shareholders would come
forward as purchasers at the restricted price of £209 and no more. And even though no purchasers should come forward to buy for £2o9, and an outsider should buy, still under the articles of association the directors could refuse to register the transfer. Hence, no one would
pay more. (On this latter point the possibility that no family purchaser would buy at £209
was so remote that the lower court ruled against it as a found fact.)
5. "It is not easy to affirm that some private and exceptional method of confining the possession of certain property to members of a family, or the special devices for ascertaining
the amount to be paid by one member, of that family to another, or another's estate upon his
death, ought to be allowed to depreciate the quota to be paid upon that property, which in the
hands of the members of the family provides them with an income and wealth that. if measured by the ordinary standards, would reach a figure at least half as high again as that which
the family estimate of the sum to be paid allows." Instant case at 126 (dissenting justice).
6. Instant case at 130; Attorney-General v. Jameson, [1904] 2 Ir. R. 644 (per Boyd, J..
and Kenny, J.) ; cf. Borland's Trustee v. Steel Bros. & Co., Ltd., [igol] i Ch. 279.
7. Instant case at 125; Attorney-General v. Jameson, [1905] 2 Ir. R. 218; Smyth v. The
Revenue Commissioners, [1O31] Ir. R. 643; Salvesen's Trustees v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue, [193o] i Scot. L. T. 387.
8. The intermediate view is that there is only one restriction facing the would-be purchaser which must be taken into consideration in determining what he would pay for the
shares-his own difficulty in not being allowed to transfer freely his shares once he has been
placed on the share register of the company. It assumes that the would-be purchaser has
already surmounted the obstacles to being placed on the register. See instant case at 125, 126.
9. Attorney-General v. Jameson, [1904] 2 Ir. R. 644 at 682 (dissent per Palles, C. B.) ; see
instant case at 130.
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articles of association. Clearly the above enumerated possibilities are of graduated fairness from the modern viewpoint that taxation should be based on
capacity to pay, 10 with the view adopted by the majority of the instant court
opening the way for the greatest chance of legal evasion of inheritance taxes.
In this light the apparently repudiated view disregarding all restrictions on the
alienability of shares for tax purposes is the preferable one when a tax problem
arises," and yet is perfectly consistent with decisions fully recognizing the effect
of reasonable share transfer restrictions as between1 2the corporation and the
shareholder where the state is not an interested party.

EvIDENcE-AGE REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUING CAPACITY

BEAR CHILDREN-T bequeathed one-fourth of his residuary estate to trustees
in trust for his daughter for life with principal at her death to her surviving
issue, and in default of such issue to a named charity. At T's death the daughter
was fifty-nine years of age and had no issue. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue refused to allow a deduction on the value of the estate given the charity,
as the event upon which the transfer to the charity was dependent had not happened. 1 The executor paid the tax, then sued to recover the amount paid. Held,
that the presumption that women may bear children at any age may be rebutted
by evidence of age alone and hence that the fund was certain to come to the
charity and was therefore deductible in calculating the tax. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 692 (1935).
In England the courts have often acted on the inference that women because
of age or other circumstances were incapable of bearing children." Allegedly
because of the indelicacy of the inquiry and the uncertainty of the result most
courts in the United States have held the presumption irrebuttable. 3 However,
the Supreme Court of the United States has refused to apply the presumption
in construing the Revenue Act where the woman was incapable of bearing
children because of a surgical operation.4 This result the instant court said
TO

io. Cf. Legis. (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 875, 879; In re Moore's Estate, 145 Atl. 727
(N. J. Prerog. Ct. 1929) (corporate assets properly taken as basis for determining value of

stock in comparatively close corporation for inheritance tax purposes); see generally 14
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAv OF PRIvATE CoRPoRATIoNs (Perm. ed. 1932) c. 6o, § 6983.
II. See Howe v. Roberts, 209 Ala. 8o, 81, 95 So. 344, 346 (1923) : "The Legislature may
grant corporate power to deny the transferability of corporate shares; but, unless it is expressly given, it does not exist; and the courts construe clauses affecting this right with a
view to the particular purpose for which they are inserted [in the corporation's charter or
certificate of incorporation] -geerally to control voting power-and give theml effect to that
extent only." (Italics supplied.) See also Chouteau Spring Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 382, 388
(855).
12. For discussions of these problems see Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del.
Ch. 343, 152 Atl 723 (193o) ; Notes (i93O) 65 A. L. R. Ii59; (1929) 42 HAxv. L. REv. 559;
(1922) I N. C. L. REv. 59.
1.43 STAT. 306 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § IO95 note; U. S. Treas. Reg. 68, art. I.
2. Leng v. Hodges, Jac. 585 (Ch. 1822) ; In re Millner's Estate, L. R. 14 Eq. 245 (Ch.
1872) ; In re White, [igoi] I Ch. 570; Browne v. Warnock, L. R. 7 Ir. Ch. D. 3 (I880) ; Re
Tinning v. Weber, 8 Ont. L. R- 703 (1904), (I905) I8 HARv. L. Rnv. 545 (specific performance). Contra: Jee v. Audley, i Cox 324 (Ch. 1787) ; In re Dawson, 39 Ch. D. I55 (888);
In re Hocking, [1898] 2 Ch. 567.
3. Hill v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 295 Ill. 61g, 129 N. E. 554 (1920) (right to partition) ; Brown v. Ousley, 198 Ky. 344, 248 S. W. 889 (1923) (marketable title) ; In re Ricards' Trust Estate, 97 Md. 6o8, 55 Atl. 384 (903).
Contra: Male v. Williams, 48 N. J. Eq.
33, 21 Atl. 854 (1891) ; Gowen's Appeal, io6 Pa. 288 (1884).
4. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U. S. 272 (1934), 47 HARv. L. REV.
io6I; Provident Trust Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 472 (Ct. Cl. 1933), 81 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 879; Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1193.
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rested on the certainty of the proof, and added thiat statistics of the Department
of Commerce showing no births to a woman over fifty-five provided as great a
degree of certainty. 5 The traditional hesitation of courts to change rules of
property will probably prevent the adoption of such a rule, commendable as it is,
in property cases. Nevertheless, it might well be applied even in property cases
where no interests are affected other than those of after-born children or of the
6
persons alleging the impossibility.
INFANTS-WARRANT OF ATTORNEY TO CONFESS JUDGMENT-Counsel submitted an agreed statement of facts: Defendant, four months before attaining his
majority, had executed a bond to plaintiff's assignor containing a warrant of
attorney for confession of judgment. Judgment thereon was entered two years
later, and twelve years after the bond's execution, plaintiff sued to renew the
lien of judgment. Held (two justices dissenting), for plaintiff, on the ground that
an infant's warrant of attorney to confess judgment is voidable, not void, and that
defendant through his inaction had ratified the judgment entered against him.'
King v. Cordrey, 177 Atl. 303 (Del. Super. Ct. 1935).
At early common law an infant's act done personally was generally held to
be voidable by the infant, the law protecting minors against their own inexperience.2 At the same time, it was equally as firmly established that an infant could
not appoint an agent, his power of attorney being void.3 The progress of the
law in subsequent centuries, however, has been slowly but consistently in the
direction of allowing infants to do through others whatever they may do themselves. 4 Nevertheless, leading cases and textbooks have generally recognized an
exception to this modern trend in the case of a warrant of attorney to confess
judgment.5 The instant case appears to be the first direct holding by a court
of record in either this country or England, that an infant's warrant of attorney
for the confession of judgment is voidable, not void. Rare cases have queried
inferentially whether this would not be a proper result." Undoubtedly the strong
5.
1932;

BIRTHS, STILLBIRTHS AND INFANT MORTALITY, U. S. Dep't of Com. 1929, 193o, 193I,
Farrington v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 3o F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. Ist, 1929) is recon-

cilable, as the woman in that case was 52 years of age, and statistics in the United States show
o.1 per IOOO births in women between the ages of 5o and 54. BIRTHs, STMLBIRTHS AND INFANT
MORTALITY, supra. In Canada, the range was from 20 to 39 per thousand, between 1921 and
193o. DouINIox BUmEAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS, vols. 1-10 (I92I-I929).
6. Note (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 50.

I. Silence has frequently been held under certain circumstances to be evidence from
which the jury could find an assent and ratification. While it was here found by the court,
the facts having been agreed upon by counsel, the result seems eminently just.
2. Tucker v. Moreland, io Pet. 58 (U. S. 1836) ; Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457 (1817);
Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794 (K. B. 1765), wherein Lord Mansfield quoted with approval
the rule of Perkins, infra note 3; Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511 (C. P. 1795).

3. "All such gifts, grants or deeds made by an infant, which do not take effect by delivery of his hand, are void. But such gifts, grants or deeds made by an infant by matter in
deed, or in writing, which take effect by delivery of his own hand, are voidable hy himself,
and his heirs, and by those which shall have his estate."

PERXMNS,

CONVEYANCING (15th ed.

1792) C. I, § 12.

4. Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457 (1817) ; Coursolle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 72
N. W. 697 (1897) ; Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, I42- N. E. 671 (924). A chronological
comparison of these cases furnishes an excellent illustration of the slow growth of the modem view.
5. Soper v. Fry, 37 Mich. 236 (1877) ; Knox v. Flack, 22 Pa. 337 (1853) ; I WILUSTON,
CONTRACTS (1920) § 227; 3 FREEMnANr, JuDGMENrs (5th ed. 1925) 2708; Note (1924) 31 A.

L. R. 1001, I017.
6. Carnahan v. Allderdice, 4 Harr. 99 (Del. 1843) ; Coursolle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn.
328, 72 N. W. 697 (1897). Note that in the Carnahan case, however, the judgment was actually set aside. As the court in the instant case points out, the setting aside of a judgment
does not necessarily mean that it was void, since it may merely have been erroneous.
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facts spurred the court into breaking away from Delaware precedent, which was
based on cases so ancient and replete with dicta that they no longer were respectable authority.7 Both reason and policy seem to favor the result. While an
infant is generally required to defend an action through a guardian rather than
in person or by an attorney, a judgment entered against him despite failure so to
appear is not entirely void." The factual difference between acting personally
and acting through another does not here justify a difference in legal effects, for
the right of disaffirmance upon coming of age would seem to be a protection as
effective in one case as in the other. Inevitably, as the dissent points out, questions as to the priority of liens and the effect of issuance of executions upon the
judgment will arise. 9 But the law should not shrink from the difficulty of
determination of superior rights, since it is principally for this purpose that it
exists. Moreover, in addition to reaching a legally correct result, the instant
decision appears also to further a desirable social policy. The protection historically accorded minors has too often been, in modern times, an instrument of
offensive injustice against the community in the hands of those to whom it was
given solely as a means of defense.' 0
MORTGAGES-BILL IN EQUITY TO REMOVE CLOUD ON TITLE WHEN COMPLAINANT Is NOT IN POSSESSioN-Complainant, to aid her husband and defend-

ant, gave a mortgage with power of sale to defendant in trust for bank, which
lent defendant and husband money on their notes. When the notes were overdue,
another note was given, and those overdue were returned to complainant marked
"cancelled."
Six years later the land was sold by defendant. Complainant
brought a bill to gain title to and possession of the land. Held, that complainant
could maintain the bill even though she was out of possession and her alleged
title was only equitable, since there was an allegation that the one in possession
had been placed there by fraud. Hanscom v. Bourne, 177 Atl. 187 (Me. 1935).
The instant case, the holding of which is in accord with the majority view,
is significant in that it represents a conscious reversal of the earlier Maine view.
The court listed Alabama, Connecticut and Massachusetts as among those states
still holding to the rule that a plaintiff out of possession can under no circumstances maintain an action in equity to set up a title.
MoRTGAGES-RIGHT TO REDEEM-INTEREST OF PURCHASER AT FoRECLOSURE SALE BEFORE EXPIRATION OF STATUTORY PERIOD OF REDEMPTION-Mort-

gages on certain property had been foreclosed, and X, assignee of the mortgagee,
had purchased the lands at foreclosure sale. By statute, mortgagor was allowed
to redeem the property within one year after the sale.' Before this period had
elapsed, mortgagor filed a petition for composition or extension under § 75 of
the Bankruptcy Act. 2 The property in question was listed as assets, and X as
a secured creditor. X objected. Held, objection sustained; X was not a mere
lienholder, but the equitable owner of the lands. In re Nelson, 9 F. Supp. 657
(D. S. D. 1935)7. Waples v. Hastings, 3 Harr. 403 (Del. 1842); Carnahan v. Allderdice, 4 Harr. 99
(Del. 1843).
8. Tweed v. Lockton, 35 Del. 474, 167 Atl. 703, 705, n. 2 (1932) ; Moore v. M'Ewen, 5
S. & R. 373 (Pa. 18ig).
9. Instant case at 308.
io. See Note (1933) 8i U. OF PA. L. REv. 731.
I. S. D. Coip. LAWS (1929) § 2887.
2. 47 STAT. 1470 (1933), n1 U. S. C. A. §2o3 (Supp. 1934).
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Where mortgaged lands may, by statute, be redeemed after sheriff's sale, a
purchaser receives a "certificate of sale", with the further right to obtain an absolute deed to the premises should the redemption period3 expire without the mortgagor's availing himself of the redemption provision. Hence there frequently
arises the problem of what is such purchaser's interest in the property during
the redemption period. The rule in Illinois is said to be that he has "no title,
either legal or equitable", but merely the right to receive the redemption money
or, on non-payment, a deed to the property.4 Alabama courts have held, on the
contrary, that he gets a fee, determinable by the mortgagor's exercising his
statutory privilege. 5 Montana in effect cleaves to the latter rule,6 while New
York's "inchoate title" doctrine in its results is similar to the former.7 In
deciding, however, that the mortgagee had "equitable title", with bare legal title
and statutory right to redeem remaining in the mortgagor, the instant case is in
accord with the large majority of jurisdictions., Although the courts, once having
adopted one of these rules, seem steadfastly to apply it without regard to changing factual situations," an investigation reveals no previous case involving the
character of the mortgagee's interest for bankruptcy purposes. Consequently it
cannot strictly be said that the apparently different rules above noted are mutually inconsistent. It is possible that expressions like "lien", "equitable title",
"inchoate interest" and "determinable fee" might prove to be synonymous when
application of the Bankruptcy Act is the dominant consideration, 10 since it seems
clear that a foreclosure sale operates to extinguish the original debt-at least
to the amount actually paid by the purchaser."l Furthermore, it appears to be
only just that the mortgagee, who has by foreclosure shown himself of all creditors most diligent in protecting his claim, should not be required to share proportionately with ordinary creditors and lienholders.
3. S. D. ComP. LAWS (1929) §§2887, 2889. Foreclosure proceedings are for these purposes regarded as identical with execution sales. See principal case at 65!; S. D. Comp.
LAws

(1929)

§ 2679.

4. Phillips v. Demoss, 14 Ill. 4I0 (1853) (confession of judgment by mortgagor in order
to create right of redemption in "judgment creditor", who has longer statutory period than
mortgagor) ; Strauss v. Tuckhorn, 200 Ill. 75, 65 N. E. 683 (i9o2) (same); Williams v.
Williston, 315 Ill.
178, 14o N. E. i43 (1925) (same).
5.Hargett v. Franklin County, 212 Ala. 423, 103 So. 40 (0925) (injunction against purchaser's carving easement out of land during redemption period, refused).
6. McQueeney v. Toomey, 36 Mont. 282, 92 Pac. 56I (igo7) (lien against mortgaged
property for deficiency judgment does not persist after redemption) ; Williard v. Campbell,
91 Mont. 493, ii P. (2d) 782 (1932) (right of one who purchases from mortgagor after sale
of mortgaged property).
7. Smith v. Colvin, 7 Barb. 157 (N. Y. 1853) (ejectment of stranger by mortgagor).
8. Page v. Rogers, 31 Cal. 293 (1866) ; Hokanson v. Gunderson, 54 Minn.499, 56 N. W.
172 (1893) ; Durfee & Doddridge, Redemptio~i from ForeclosureSale (1925) 23 MIcH. L.
R-v. 825, 843. But cf. North Dakota Horse & Cattle Co. v. Serumgard, 17 N. D. 466, 490,
117 N. W. 453, 463 (I908).
9.Hardin v. Kelley, 144 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 8th, I9O6) (attaching creditor attempting to
redeem from superior lien) ; Hargett v. Franklin County, 212 Ala. 423, 103 So. 40 (925)
(grant of easement by mortgagee-purchaser during redemption period) ; Stout v. Keyes, 2
Doug. 184 (Mich. 1845) (case by mortgagee-purchaser against stranger who entered and cut
timber during redemption period); Hokanson v. Gunderson, 54 Minn. 499, 56 N. W. 172
(1893) (question of joinder of purchaser in action against mortgagor on mechanic's lien).
Io. That slipshod terminology alone may cause sinfilar results to appear inconsistent was
demonstrated by the court in the principal case at 661. Cf. the language in Wood v. Conrad,
2 S. D. 405, 5o N. W. 9o3 (1892); Farr v. Semmler, 24 S.D. 290, 123 N. W. 835 (Igog) ; 3
JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2129; 2 WvILTSI, MoRTGAGE FoaEcLosURE (4th ed. 1927)
§ 797. See astute discussions in Hardin v. Kelley, i44 Fed. 353, 354 (C. C. A. 8th, x9o6) ;
Page v. Rogers, 31 Cal. 293, 300-302 (1866) ; Whiting v. Butler, 29 Mich. 122, 128-130 (0874),
per Cooley, J.
I1. 2 Wn.TSIE, op. cit. slupra note 10, § 1034; see State ex rel. Hale v. McGee, 38 S. D.
257, 263, i6o N. W. ioog, 1oo (917).
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SURETYSHIP-SUBROGATION-SURETY'S RIGHT TO PRO TANTO SUBROGATION TO MATERIALMEN'S CLAIM WHEN SURETY PAID THE FULL PENALTY ON

THE BOND--Contractor completed work under his contract with the United
States, but did not perform the provision in the contract for paying materialmen

promptly. Claimant was surety on a bond given to protect the United States and

materialmen, 1 and, after contractor had been adjudged bankrupt, paid the

penalty on the bond. This sum was distributed ratably to materialmen, leaving
a balance due them from contractor. Under an indemnity contract 2 executed
by contractor prior to the date of the bond, claimant asserted priority in a fund
representing retained percentages 8 paid by the United States to contractor's
trustee. Held (one justice dissenting), that claimant should receive nothing
from the bankrupt's estate until all creditors had been satisfied, since a surety
may not be subrogated to a fund due a contractor until the latter's creditors are
fully paid, the bond having been intended to protect materialmen. 4 Amwrican
Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., 75 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 5th,
1935).
The general rule, that a surety has an equitable right to be subrogated to the
rights of the principal's creditors 5 only when the creditors have been paid in
full,6 does have several exceptions. Thus, a surety has been given a preference
over subsequent assignees of the contractor, 7 on the grounds that the surety's
right was first in time, and that the assignee was a "mere volunteer"; a surety
which completed the work after the contractor abandoned it has been allowed
priority even over materialmen who were lienors; and a surety which had
taken assignments of creditors' claims has been awarded a pro tanto share in a
bankrupt contractor's estate. 9 Nevertheless, none of these special factors were
present in the instant case, and, because of the strong governmental policy in
protecting materialmen, 10 it is sub-mitted that the court correctly decided this case
in so far as it prevented the surety from sharing in the bankrupt's assets until
i. This bond was required under 33 STAT. 811 (905), 40 U. S. C. A. §270 (928).
2. The contract provided that if surety was required to pay because contractor breached
his contract with the United States, surety should be subrogated to contractor's rights for any
sums due on the contract, including "deferred payments."
3. Part of the price to have been held back by the United States under the contract until
the work had been completed. This fund was insufficient to satisfy both surety and materialmen.

4. This appears to be the holding, for, although the majority opinion seems merely to
have denied surety a priority in the retained percentages, the dissenting judge objected to the
decision as "totally excluding the surety", and argued that claimants should at least share
with the materialmen, as common creditors, in bankrupt's general assets.
5. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 548 (1888) ; 5 POFaOY, EQuIY
JUIRISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 2344.

6. United States v. National Surety Co., 254 U. S. 73 (2920), (1922) 70 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 245; Jenkins v. National Surety Co., 277 U. S. 258 (1928) ; Mississippi v. First Nat.
Bank of Greenwood, 66 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; see PotmEoY, op. cit. supra note 5,
§ 2350.

7. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U. S. 227 (1896) (surety, to protect itself,
had completed the work after contractor abandoned it) ; Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 2o8 U. S. 404 (19o8) ; State ex rel Southern Surety Co. v. Schlesinger,
114 Ohio St. 323, 151 N. E. 177, 45 A. L. R. 379 (1926).
8. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Board of Water Com'rs, 66 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933) ; Saint Peter's Catholic Church v. Vannote, 66 N. J. Eq. 78, 56 Atl. 1037 (19o4) ; Arrow
Iron Works v. Greene, 26o N. Y. 330, 183 N. E. 515 (1932).
q. Alexander Lumber Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., I F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 7th),
cert. denied, 266 U. S. 628 (1924).
2O. In the case of private contracts statutes frequently provide for a materialman's lien:
in public works contracts, for a bond with surety. See Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1135,
1136, 1143.

RECENT CASES

the materialmen had been paid in full."' But the court should have allowed the
surety, after the materialmen should have been satisfied, (I) to have a priority
in any remainder of the fund representing retained percentages, for the in2
demnity contract created an equitable charge on that fund, subject, as shown
above, to materialmen's claims; and (2) to share equally with the contractor's
general creditors for the balance of its claim.' 8

TORTS-LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-NoN-PERFORMANCE

OF

LANDLORD'S

PROMISE TO REPAIR AS THE BASIS FOR NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES TO TENANT-A tenant brought an action against his landlord to recover for personal injuries sustained in falling through a defective porch floor.

The written lease had no provision respecting the obligation to repair; but the
lessor, both before and after the execution of the lease, made oral promises to
repair. Held, that non-performance of the lessor's contract to repair was negligence justifying tort recovery. Dean v. Hershowitz, 177 Atl. 262 (Conn. 1935).
It is elementary that a landlord, in the absence of a contract to repair, is
under no common law duty to repair leased premises.' It is equally well settled
that in a contract action upon a covenant to repair, damages for personal injuries
sustained by the tenant are "too remote", as not being within the contemplation
of the parties when the contract was made.2 By universal assumption, the tenant would fare no better in a tort action based upon the breach of a contract
to repair, if the contract was made by one other than the lessor. 3 But where
the lessor promises, the growing minority which, with the Restatement of Torts,
imposes tort liability, 4 professes to find a duty which is said to be imposed by law
upon a relation created by contract. 5 Because this principle does not suggest
why the third party should not be equally liable, a more accurate formulation of
II. A contrary holding would defeat the purpose of the bond, which is required in order
to protect materialmen. See American Surety Co. v. Finletter, 274 Fed. 852, 159 (C. C. A.
3d, I921).
12. For

the pertinent provisions in the contract for indemnification see note 2, supra. An
equitable lien is created on any particular fund which the debtor had contracted, in writing,
to make security for a debt. Walker v. Brown, 65 U. S. 654 (1897). The retained fund may
even be awarded to materialmen in exoneration of surety. See Glades County v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 57 F. (2d) 449, 451 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
13. Guise v. John C. Guise, Inc., 112 N. J. Eq. Ii, 63 Atl. 121 (1932).
i. Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers' Ice Co., 1I4 Ark. 532, 170 S. W. 241 (1914) ; Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 124 N. E. 13 (1919) ; Gott & Farquharson v. Gandy, 2 E. &
B. 845 (K. B. 1853).
; Murrell v. Crawford, io2 Kan.
2. Hanson v. Cruse, 155 Ind. 176, 57 N. E. 904 (900)
[tort
118, I69 Pac. 56I (i919). Contra: Hart v. Coleman, 201 Ala. 345, 78 So. 201 (917)
liability had been previously denied, 192 Ala. 447, 68 So. 385 (0915)].
3. See Dice's Adm'r v. Zweigart's Adm'r, I61 Ky. 646, 649, 171 S. W. 195, 197 (914);
RESrATEENT, TORTS (934) § 357 (imposes liability if "the lessor, as sch, has agreed . . .
to keep the land in repair") (italics supplied).
4. Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, IO4 N. W. 289 (19o5) ; Robinson v. Heil, 128 Md.
Contra:
645, 98 Atl. 195 (1916) ; Ashman v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 178 Pac. 234 (919).
; Tuttle v. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145
Murrell v. Crawford, IO2 Kan. 118, 169 Pac. 56i (97)
Mass. i69, 13 N. E. 465 (1887) ; Schick v. Fleischauer, 26 App. Div. 210, 49 N. Y. Supp. 962
(1898). For full citation of cases, see BoHLEN, CASES ON TORTS (3d ed. 193o) 44o n. 12, 442
n. 13; Notes (192o) 8 A. L. R. 765; (i93o) 68 A. L. R. 1194.
5. This is apparently the theory adopted by the RESTATEMENT. In the Comment to § 357
it is said that "The lessor's duty to repair in so far as its breach subjects him to liability for
bodily harm caused to the lessee and those upon the land in his right, is not contractual but is
a tort duty based on the fact that the contract gives the lessor ability to make the repairs and
control over them. . . . Since the duty arises out of the existence of the contract to repair,
the contract defines the extent of the duty." See also HARPE, TORTS (933) 236.
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the basis of liability would seem to be that in the existing landlord-tenant relationship, it is negligence on the part of the landlord to fail to carry out the promise
to repair. A valid distinction between the lessor and third party cases then
becomes apparent from the fact that the lessor should realize the peculiar probability that the tenant will not hire someone else to make repairs which the landlord
has undertaken to perform. A professional carpenter, on the other hand, might
well expect that if he failed to perform his contract to repair, the tenant would
take his business elsewhere. The probability of reliance upon the lessor's
promise is especially high where, as is doubtless the usual case, the landlord's
undertaking is gratuitous-perhaps made in the course of cajoling a complaining
tenant into paying the month's rent. The tenant is certainly not going to pay for
repairs which his landlord has promised to do for nothing. The theory here
urged would assimilate this case to that small group of cases like Siegel v. Spear,6
and Carrv. Maine Central R. R.7 which support a more generalized rule of liability for negligent non-performance of a promise. It would dispense with
difficulties like the parol evidence rule or lack of consideration, s and by eliminating these contractual elements from the case would remove the superficial anomaly
of entertaining the defenses of contributory negligence and voluntary assumption
of risk to a claim ostensibly resting on contract.
6. 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (923)
(gratuitous bailee of furniture who promised to
have it insured, held liable when the furniture was destroyed by fire, no insurance having been
placed). See Note (923) 9 CORN. L. Q. 54, reprinted in SEL~cT READINGS ON CONTRAcrs
(93)

539.
7. 78 N. H.

502, io2

Atl. 532 (917)

(railroad held liable for negligent failure to per-

form its promise to file with the Interstate Commerce Commission papers upon which plaintiff's right to a rebate depended, when the shipper had entrusted the papers to the defendant) ; cf. REsTATEmENT, CoNTRAcrs (1932) § 9o (promissory estoppel).
8. The court in the instant case, while purporting to insist upon a contract, seems willing
not to be exacting as to either of these elements of the contract. Instant case at 266, 267.
But in Newman v. Golder, io8 Conn. 676, 144 Atl. 467 (Ig29), where the only promises made
by the landlord were subsequent to the lease and unsupported by consideration, recovery was
denied.

